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a 
The 2008 housing market collapse was monumental in its propor-tions and effects. 'The subprime 
mortgage crisis led to the demise of 
scores of banks and venerable finan-
cial institutions that had invested too 
heavily in mortgage-backed securities. 
'Those left standing are now the tar-
get of a plethora of lawsuits seeking to 
lay blame for the collapse. 'The banks 
are not alone. Regulators, government 
agencies, and bond rating companies 
have all been accused of contributing 
to the financial crises; lawsuits against 
these entities continue to mount. Even 
participants on the periphery, such as 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System, Inc. (MERS), being neither ser-
vicers nor originators of loans, have 
been pulled into the litigation fray. 
Whether MERS should rightfully 
bear any blame for the crisis seems 
beside the point. As the entity hold-
ing or enforcing a defaulted mortgage 
that is in-or heading toward-
foreclosure, MERS has become an 
obvious target for distraught bor-
rowers and distressed debtors. These 
borrowers have asser.ted hundreds 
of offensive and defensive claims 
against MERS, generally designed to 
invalidate a defaulted mortgage or 
bar foreclosure. 
The hostility against MERS 
revealed in many of these claims 
apparently stems from the basic fact 
that MERS makes transfers of mort-
gage loans possible without the 
transparency of the public mortgage 
recording system. But as the vast 
majority of courts have now recog-
nized, MERS's mortgage role is not 
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sinister or even unorthodox; rather, 
it is grounded in traditional agency 
relationships. And while that agency 
relationship may vest MERS with 
the power to exercise the lender's 
rights in the mortgage, it was not cre-
ated to facilitate improper transfers 
of the loans or to shield informa-
tion from borrowers or other market 
participants. 
MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., is a 
privately held corporation that owns 
and manages the MERS System. It is 
a member-based organization made 
up of about 3,000 lenders, servicers, 
sub-services, investors, and govern-
ment institutions. 'The MERS System 
was conceived in 1993 by a group of 
leading mortgage market participants, 
including the Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, the Federal Housing 
Administration, the Department of 
Veteran Affairs, JP Morgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
Bank, that were looking for an effi-
cient and reliable system for tracking 
transfers of residential mortgages in 
the increasingly securitized mortgage 
market. What emerged was a sys-
tem whereby MERS, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of MERSCORP Hold-
ings, is designated as the mortgagee 
of record serving for loans regis-
tered in the MERS System. MERS 
does not hold the promissory note, 
which means that it holds no benefi-
cial interest in the loan transactions or 
right of repayment; it merely serves 
as nominee for the lender and the 
lender's successors and assigns. 
Land records are designed to show 
subsequent transfers of mortgage 
lien interests (not transfers of prom-
issory notes or servicing rights). In 
most states, transfers of mortgage 
lien interests are not required to be 
recorded, and transfer of notes and 
servicing rights are evidenced in the 
records of the parties involved. 
Before MERS, when an interest 
in a mortgage loan was transferred, 
the parties would often change the 
mortgagee by recording an assign-
ment of the mortgage in the land 
records. This process was time-con-
suming, costly, and liable to all the 
vagaries of public recording, like mis-
indexing and contested priorities. In 
contrast, when a loan is registered 
on the MERS System, MERS remains 
the record mortgagee as nominee, or 
agent, for the new beneficial owner 
of the promissory note. MERS tracks 
transfers in the underlying promis-
sory note and the servicing rights 
in MERS's electronic database. Bor-
rowers have access to both a toll-free 
number and an Internet web site 
(www.mers-serviceid.org/ sis / index) 
that provide the identity of the 
servicer and, in many cases, the ben-
eficial owner of their mortgage loans. 
As MERS's web site states, MERS was 
created "to streamline the mortgage 
process by using electronic commerce 
to eliminate paper." See About Us, 
MERS, www.mersinc.org/about-us/ 
about-us. 
Despite the simple premise of 
the MERS System, opponents-or 
those simply trying to invalidate 
or forestall enforcement of their 
mortgages-have leveled various 
challenges to MERS's practices and 
even its basic business model. Taking 
an aerial view of the challenges, it is 
possible to discern a certain pattern 
as one challenge seemed to morph 
into the next (often following rejec-
tion of the earlier one in the courts). 
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Some borrowers have asserted that 
MERS lacked legal standing to fore-
close because it was a mere nominee 
and not the owner of the note. Even 
if MERS's legal standing was upheld, 
borrowers pointed to the nominee 
status as an empty formality, arguing 
that it deprived MERS of the requi-
site beneficial interest to commence 
foreclosure or assign the security 
instrument, even to the holder who 
had since acquired the beneficial 
interest. When the lender or note 
owner commenced foreclosures or 
sought to enforce the lien instead of 
MERS, borrowers still challenged 
the security instrument, arguing that 
MERS's designation as nominee con-
stituted an impermissible split of the 
note from the mortgage, rendering 
both unenforceable. 
From this distant vantage, all the 
challenges might be viewed as per-
mutations of the same theme-who 
has the legal power and interest suf-
ficient to enforce the security given 
for a loan? The over arching response 
is that MERS, as nominee or agent for 
the beneficial owner, has the power to 
enforce the lien and security interest. 
MERS's Status as Nominee 
for the Lender Provides 
Standing to Foreclose 
Standing, one of the earliest chal-
lenges to the MERS System, refers to 
the legal right to set judiciallTIachin-
ery in motion. Borrowers have 
maintained that MERS lacks standing 
because it is merely the nominee for 
the lender and not the lender in fact 
and that, as mere nominee, its lack of 
a beneficial interest in the underlying 
indebtedness means it has suffered 
no injury by the default. 
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Both of these challenges ignore the 
basic idea of standing. One can right-
fully invoke the jurisdiction of the 
court where one holds, in an individ-
ual or representative capacity, some 
real interest in the cause of action, 
or a legal or equitable right, title, or 
interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy. RMS Residential Props., 
LLC v. Miller, 32 A.3d 307 (Conn. 
2011); Trotter v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, 
275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). In other 
words, standing requires that a liti-
gant have a sufficient and adversarial 
stake in the matter, with substantial 
potential for real harm flowing from 
the outcome of the case. Bank ofN.Y. 
v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435 (NJ Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 2010); Mortgage Elec. Reg-
istration Sys., Inc. v. Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 
118 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
MERS's legal rights and interest in 
the mortgage transaction are set out 
in the security instrument executed 
by the borrower at loan origination. 
The standard language in a security 
instrument registered in the MERS 
System names MERS as "mortgagee, 
solely as nominee for Lender and 
Lender's successors and assigns" and 
further states: 
Borrower understands and 
agrees that MERS holds only 
legal title to the interests 
granted by Borrower .... MERS 
... has the right: to exercise any 
or all of those interests, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the right 
to foreclose and sell a Property; 
and to take any action required 
of Lender including, but not 
limited to, releasing and cancel-
ling this [] Instrument. 
See Barnes, 940 N.E.2d at 120; Cul-
hane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826 
F. Supp. 2d 352, 370 (D. Mass. 2011), 
aff'd, 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013). 
With such an express conferral 
of the power to foreclose, why have 
challenges to MERS's standing not 
been dismissed out of hand? The use 
of the term "nominee" may provide 
the answer. The term is not widely 
used or understood, and challengers 
have pointed to what they perceive 
as limitations inherent in that status. 
They argue that the term is dichoto-
mous: a nominee seeks the power 
to foreclose because it stands in the 
place of the lender, but does not have 
the power to foreclose because it is 
not the lender in fact. MERS cannot, it 
is claimed, be both the agent and the 
principal. 
In discerning the meaning of 
"nominee" in the MERS context, 
courts have not confined their inquiry 
to the text of the security instrument 
but instead have consulted extrin-
sic sources, most notably Black's Law 
Dictionary. See Edwards v. Mortgage 
Elec. Registration Sys., 300 P.3d 43, 49 
(Idaho 2013); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 
280 P.3d 225,231 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); 
Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. of 
Ams., No. 12-10337-DPW, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114196, at *21 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 14,2012). "Nominee" is defined 
as "[a] person designated to act in 
place of another, usu. in a very lim-
ited way," or "[a] party who holds 
bare legal title for the benefit of oth-
ers." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009). Thus, MERS is an agent for the 
lender, and its successors and assigns, 
for the limited purpose of holding 
and enforcing the security agreement. 
It holds the security instrument in its 
own name, but it does so in a repre-
sentative capacity. 
Tha t MERS lacks an economic or 
beneficial interest in the underly-
ing indebtedness does not deprive 
it of the standing this status con-
fers. Although a few courts have 
questioned MERS's interest in the 
mortgage for purposes of assert-
ing rights relating to the mortgage, 
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. 
v. Southwest. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 
S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009), Mortgage Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 
A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010), Landmark 
Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 
2009), most courts confronted with 
the issue have found that MERS's 
status as record mortgagee, holding 
legal and record title to the security 
instrument and the power to act for 
the note holder, is sufficient for MERS 
to commence a foreclosure in its own 
name. Edwards, 2013 WL 1760620, at 
*16; Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 
2013 WL 1498655, at *8-15 (RI. Apr. 
12,2013); Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mortg. 
Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012); 
In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
No. A12-0387, 2012 WL 5289866, at *6 
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 29,2012); Jack-
son v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009); 
Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 118. For instance, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that MERS has the ability to institute 
foreclosure by advertisement because 
"a party can hold legal title to the secu-
rity instrument without holding an 
interest in the promissory note." Jackson, 
770 N.W.2d at 500-1. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has agreed, holding 
that MERS had the contractual author-
ity to foreclose under the terms of the 
mortgage. Bucci,2013 WL 1498655, at 
*8-15. Likewise, in Edwards, the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of 
the brrower' s challenge to a nonjudicial 
foreclosure and rejected the borrow-
ers' argument that MERS could not act 
as the beneficiary on the deed of trust 
absent an interest in the promissory 
note. 2013 WL 1760620, at *4-5. 
Thus, MERS's lack of an economic 
interest in the loan is beside the point. 
MERS's status as mortgagee with 
authority to act on behalf of the party 
that holds that economic interest is 
the key. Courts have explained that, 
because MERS "enforce[s] the mort-
gage on behalf of the owner of the note, 
a party that is unquestionably entitled 
to enforce the obligation the mortgage 
secures[,]" MERS has the power to fore-
close, Bucci, 2013 WL 1498655, at *16, 
and that foreclosure can be brought by 
MERS even though beneficial owner-
ship of the note is in another. Barnes, 940 
N.E.2d 118. These courts are cognizant 
of the difference between ownership of 
an interest in the note and "ownership 
of the mortgage" and have explained 
that the latter is sufficient to render 
MERS a real party in interest, with 
standing to foreclose. See, e.g., Residen-
tial Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 805 
N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich. 2011); Culhane 
v. Aurora Loan Services, 708 F.3d 282 (1st 
Cir. 2013) ("The mortgage need not pos-
sess any scintilla of a beneficial interest 
in order to hold the mortgage"). 
In jurisdictions that require evidence 
of the promissory note as a prerequisite 
to a judicial foreclosure, foreclosure of 
a MERS mortgage requires that same 
proof. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Alex-
ander, 280 P.3d 936 (Okla. 2012); U.S. 
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087 
(Vt. 2011). The holder of the mortgage 
must demonstrate rightful possession 
of the promissory note as the original 
payee, assignee by a valid assignment, 
or lawful holder of the note. In re Miller 
v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 666 F.3d 
1255 (10th Cir. 2012); CPT Asset Backed 
Certificates v. Cin Kham, 278 P.3d 586 
(Okla. 2012); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust 
Co. v. Richardson, 273 P.3d 50 (Okla. 
2012). In deed of trust jurisdictions, in 
which foreclosures take place by power 
of sale, courts have been nearly uniform 
in ruling that the party commencing 
foreclosure need not possess the prom-
issory note. See, e.g., Burnett v. Mortgage 
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 
1243 (10th Cir. 2013). These courts rec-
ognize that the original parties are free 
to contract at the outset to have some-
one other than the beneficial owner of 
the debt act on behalf of that owner to 
enforce rights granted in the security 
instrument. Id.; see also Patterson v. Citi-
Mortgage, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-0339-CC, 
2012 WL 4468750, at *12 (ND. Ga. Sept. 
26, 2012) (possession or holding the 
note not required). According to these 
cases, when a deed of trust expressly 
provides for MERS to have the power 
of sale, then MERS has the power of 
sale. See Grubbs v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 
4:12CV472,2012 WL5463865 (ED. Tex. 
Nov. 8,2012). 
In a few limited cases, when a fore-
closure statute prescribes specific 
interests required to invoke the statute, 
courts have interpreted the language to 
require that the foreclosing party hold 
an economic interest in the underlying 
debt. The Washington Supreme Court, 
in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, 
Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) (en banc), 
read the trust deed statute quite literally 
and found that "MERS is an ineligi-
ble 'beneficiary' within the terms of 
the Washington Deed of Trust Act, if it 
never held the promissory note or other 
debt instrument secured by the deed 
of trust." Id. at 47. Similarly; in Niday 
v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 284 P.3d 1157 
(Or. Ct. App. 2012), the Oregon Court 
of Appeals read "beneficiary" of a trust 
deed, for purposes of the Oregon Trust 
Deed Act, to mean the person named or 
otherwise designated in the trust deed 
as the person to whom the secured 
obligation is owed, that is, the original 
lender. Id. at 1164. When the benefi-
ciary assigns its interest in the trust 
deed without recording that assign-
ment, under Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.735(1), a 
predicate to nonjudicial foreclosure may 
not be satisfied. Id. at 1169. These cases, 
however, are the exception rather than 
the rule, and they have been construed 
narrowly. See Zalac v. CTX Mortg. Corp., 
No. C12-01474 MJP, 2013 WL562892 
(W.o. Wash. Feb. 14,2013) (distinguish-
ing Bain and dismissing claim that 
MERS's role on deed of trust violated 
the state consumer protection act). 
As a general rule, the broad language 
in a MERS security instrument estab-
lishes that MERS, the record mortgagee 
as nominee for the lender, possesses 
and can assert all the powers of a mort-
gagee, including the power to foreclose. 
The vast majority of the courts have rec-
ognized this, and challenges to MERS's 
standing to foreclose have accord-
ingly dwindled. Nevertheless, MERS 
has recently amended its Membership 
Rules to require that, before initiation 
of any foreclosure, the security instru-
ment must be assigned from MERS to 
the note owner or servicer. Foreclosures 
may no longer be initiated in MERS's 
name. See MERS System Rules of Mem-
bership Rule 8 (2011 amendment). 
MERS Has the Authority to 
ASSign the Security Instrument 
Even before the rule change above, 
MERS often assigned the mortgage 
or deed of trust to the note owner or 
holder in anticipation of foreclosure. 
This provided yet another basis for 
challenge by defaulting borrowers-the 
claim that MERS lacks the author-
ity to assign the security instrument. 
Although courts will scrutinize the form 
and sufficiency of the actual assignment 
between note holders, Citimortgage, Inc. 
v. Stosel, 934 N.y'S.2d 182 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011) (failure to prove ownership 
of the note by delivery or valid assign-
ment), they have had little difficulty 
finding MERS's power to assign the 
security instrument as inherent in the 
powers originally granted. In Culhane, 
the First Circuit held that MERS had 
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the authority "twice over" to assign the 
mortgage. This authority derived frm 
MERS's status as equitable trustee for 
the note holder and from the terms of 
the mortgage contract. 708 F.3d at 293. 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming also addressed the 
issue of "whether MERS had author-
ity to assign the mortgage to the [loan 
servicing company], on behalf of the 
Lender .... " In re Relka, No. 09-20806, 
2009 WL 5149262, at *4 (Bankr. D. 
Wyo. Dec. 22, 2009). Relying on the 
standard language in a MERS secu-
rity instrument, the court concluded 
that "[0 ]ne of the actions that this Court 
would include in this non-exclusive 
listing of rights, is the right to assign 
the mortgage." Id. at *5. 
Alternatively, courts often find the 
power to assign immillle from chal-
lenge by one who is not a party to the 
assignment. Allemon v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., No. 11-15400,2012 WL 
5300344, at *4 (ED. Mich. Oct. 25,2012); 
but see Culhane, 708 F.3d 289-91 (mort-
gagor has standing to challenge the 
assignment of a mortgage to the extent 
necessary to contest a foreclosing enti-
ty's status quo mortgagee, by showing 
the assignment was void because 
the assignor had nothing to assign or 
lacked authority to assign, but not by 
showing that an assignment, otherwise 
effective to pass legal title, was merely 
voidable at the election of one party). 
MERS's Role as Nominee 
Does Not Sever the Note 
and Mortgage 
Because the challenges to MERS's 
right to foreclose and its ability to 
assign have been largely illlsuccess-
ful, defaulting borrowers turned to a 
more flUldamental attack on the MERS 
System. They claim that MERS's sta-
tus as the mortgagee on the security 
instrument separates the owner-
ship of the note and the mortgage 
and renders the mortgage illlenforce-
able. The prevalence of this argument 
is somewhat surprising because an 
arrangement whereby a note holder 
appoints another to enforce the obliga-
tions illlder the note was not invented 
by MERS, but, rather, is a long-standing 
practice in mortgage transactions that 
is well-groilllded in agency law. 
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Mortgage Follows the Note, 
But Note Holder Can Appoint 
Another to Enforce 
As a general rule, a promissory note 
and the mortgage securing it are 
inseparable; the transfer of the note is 
deemed to transfer the right to enforce 
the mortgage as well. But this does not 
prevent the note holder from appoint-
ing another to hold and enforce the 
mortgage on its behalf. The Restate-
ment of Property expresses the widely 
held principle that "[a] transfer of an 
obligation secured by a mortgage also 
transfers the mortgage unless the parties 
to the transfer agree otherwise," Restate-
ment (Third) of Property: Mortgages 
§ 5.4(a) (emphasis added), but that "[a] 
mortgage may be enforced only by, or 
in behalf of, a person who is entitled to 
enforce the obligations the mortgage 
secures." Id. § 5.4(c). 
When the mortgage and the right of 
enforcement of the obligation it secures 
are separated, the separation typically 
precludes the holder of the note from 
foreclosing and results in a practical 
loss of the efficacy of the mortgage. But 
"this result is changed if [a party] has 
authority ... to enforce the mortgage 
on ... behalf [of the holder of the note]." 
Id. § 5.4, cmt. e. Thus, as the Restate-
ment explains, there is no separation 
in that scenario, and the note remains 
secured because the party holding the 
mortgage has the authority to enforce 
the mortgage for the owner or holder 
of the note. For example, the named 
mortgagee "may be a trustee or agent 
of [the note holder] with responsibil-
ity to enforce the mortgage at [the note 
holder's] direction." Id. 
The Restatement explains that this 
position aims to avoid the economically 
wasteful consequences of an illlen-
forceable mortgage; the common law 
strives to achieve unity of the note and 
mortgage interests even if the courts 
must supply gaps in the documents. 
Id. In fact, although the Restatement 
acknowledges "rare occasions" when 
the mortgagee may wish to disassoci-
ate the obligation and mortgage, "that 
result should follow only upon evi-
dence that the parties to the transfer so 
agreed." Id § 5.4 cmt. a. The Restate-
ment urges courts to be vigorous in 
seeking to find such "a[n agency] 
relationship, since the result is oth-
erwise likely to be a windfall for the 
mortgagor and the frustration of [the 
note owner's] expectation of security." 
Id. § 5.4 cmt. e. 
The plain language of MERS's stan-
dard security instrument does not 
establish an intent to separate the note 
and the mortgage. The very opposite 
is true. 
Agency Relation Results from 
the Powers Granted in the 
Deed of Trust 
As the Restatement suggests, a fatal 
split can also be avoided by examin-
ing the relation between the nominee 
and lender illlder the lens of agency 
law. An agency relationship exists when 
a principal (the original lender) mani-
fests assent to have another, MERS (the 
agent), act on its behalf, subject to the 
principal's control and consent of the 
agent. Restatement (Third) of Agency 
§ 1.01. An agent can act on behalf of 
both a disclosed principal (the original 
lender) and a later unidentified princi-
pal (lender's successor and assign). Id. 
§ 1.04. A MERS mortgage names MERS 
as the mortgagee in its capacity as nom-
inee for the defined "lender" illlder 
the mortgage, and for the lender's suc-
cessors and assigns-the subsequent 
transferees of the note. That the par-
ties used the term "nominee" instead 
of "agent" makes no difference, as the 
label affixed to the relation does not 
determine the nature of that relation-
ship. rd. § 1.02. Instead, "the legal status 
of a nominee depends on the context 
of the relationship of the nominee to its 
principal." Howie, 280 P.3d at 231 (quot-
ing Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 
P.3d 158, 166 (Kan. 2009)); Restatement 
(Third) Agency § 1.02 cmt. b. 
As one court explained, the standard 
language in a MERS security instru-
ment "is more than sufficient to create 
an agency relationship between MERS 
and the Lender and its successors in Mis-
souri, regardless [sic] what term they 
used to describe that relationship." In 
re Tucker,441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. WD. 
Mo. 2010) (emphasis added). All sub-
sequent note holders take subject to 
the agency relationship created in the 
deed of trust. "[T]he effect of the MERS 
system in Missouri is that even if, as 
here, the deed of trust is recorded in 
the name of the original lender ... the 
holder of the note, whoever it is, would 
be entitled to foreclose, even if the deed 
of trust had not been assigned to it." Id. 
at 644-45. 
Moreover, MERS's role as mort-
gagee for another is not novel. It is 
common practice for a trustee or 
straw man to hold a mortgage inter-
est in the land records on behalf of 
another. Both before and since MERS 
was created, servicers on loans have 
often held the record interest in mort-
gages on behalf of the beneficial 
owners of the loans. 
MERS's Governing Rules 
Confirm the Agency 
Relationship 
MERS's rules of membership con-
firm the agency relationship created 
in the security instrument. The rules 
provide that MERS's members "shall 
cause [MERS] to appear in the appli-
cable public land records as the 
Mortgagee of Record as Nominee 
for the Note Owner and its succes-
sors and/ or assigns with respect to 
each Mortgage loan that the Mem-
ber registers on the MERS System," 
and that "[i]n the absence of coun-
trary instructions from the Note 
owner, MESRCORP Holdings, and 
MERS may rely on instructions from 
the Servicer or Subservicer shown 
on the MERS System with respect 
to transfers of legal title of the note 
or mortgage, transfers of contrac-
tual servicing rights, and releases of 
any security interests applicable to 
such mortgage loan." MERS Rules of 
Membership, Rule 2, §§ 4 & 5 (Mar. 
2013). 
These rules are incorporated into 
lenders' membership agreements. 
The deed of trust and member-
ship agreements authorize MERS to 
perform specific delegable acts for 
the lender and its assigns, includ-
ing holding legal title to the deed of 
trust and exercising any of the rights 
granted to the lender thereunder. 
MERS does so at the direction and 
control of the note owner. In this way, 
the holder of the note, the principal, 
always retains the right to enforce the 
secured obligation. The courts have 
found that these rules confirm the 
agency relationship between MERS 
and its members, noting that the 
lenders" signed up for this agency 
relationship in their membership 
agreements." Tucker, 441 B.R. at 646. 
Severance Arguments 
Made and Rejected 
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision 
in Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 216 
P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009), fueled MERS's 
"severance" argument, though the case 
is generally cited solely for the stray 
dicta it contains. There, the trustee 
under the first deed of trust (Land-
mark) filed a petition to foreclose but 
did not serve either MERS, the nomi-
nee for the lender under a second deed 
of trust, or the assignee of the note 
(Sovereign) on the second loan. Sov-
ereign sought to set aside the default 
judgment and sheriff's sale on the 
ground that MERS was a contingently 
necessary party under Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 60-219(a). The Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to vacate. Because MERS had 
not demonstrated a direct, ascertain-
able loss from the foreclosure, it failed 
to establish the predicate for setting 
aside a judgment. Id. at 169-70. 
In dicta, the court commented on 
MERS's role, likening it more to a 
"straw man than to a party possess-
ing all the rights given a buyer" and 
stating that MERS had few rights, if 
any, other than acting on behalf of the 
lender to secure the lender's rights 
when necessary. Id. at 166. Although 
the court did not determine whether 
any severance existed in that case, it 
surmised that "in the event" that the 
mortgage loan somehow becomes 
separated from the security inter-
est, the mortgage "may" become 
unenforceable. Id. at 166-67. In so 
doing, the court did not otherwise 
examine the relevant language of the 
mortgage and MERS's membership 
agreements with the lender. A close 
reading of the case reveals that reli-
ance on that case in support of the 
proposition that naming MERS as 
nominee works a severance of the 
mortgage from the note is surely mis-
placed. Rather than a broad policy 
position, the case was in fact decided 
on something very mundane-pro-
cedure. Thus, Landmark merely stated 
the uncontroversial proposition that 
the enforceability of a MERS mort-
gage may turn on the relationship 
between MERS and the holder of the 
note. 
Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 
LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2009), is also frequently cited on 
the severance issue, again inaptly. 
There, the court of appeals held that 
Ocwen, the assignee of the deed of 
trust, lacked standing to challenge 
a quiet title judgment following a 
tax sale absent evidence of the own-
ership of the promissory note. The 
court stated, in dicta, that the "prac-
tical effect of splitting the deed of 
trust from the promissory note is to 
make it impossible for the holder of 
the note to foreclose, unless the holder 
of the deed of trust is the agent of the 
holder of the note." Id. at 623 (empha-
sis added) (citing Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Mortgages § 5.4). As in 
Landmark, the Bellistri court did not 
decide whether an agency relation-
ship existed that would validate the 
note under the cited Restatement 
provision because there was no evi-
dence regarding the current holder 
of the note. Id. at 623. In a subse-
quent suit filed by MERS in federal 
court to set aside the tax sale, when 
evidence was presented to establish 
that MERS held legal title to the deed 
of trust on behalf of the note owner 
and note holder, the district court 
held that MERS was entitled to bring 
suit to redress the injury to its prin-
cipal and had standing to challenge 
the very same tax sale. Mortgage Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellistri, No. 
4:09-CV-731 CAS, 2010 WL 2720802, 
at *15 (ED. Mo. July 1, 2010). 
Other courts from these jurisdic-
tions, both federal and state, have 
rejected the severance argument 
alluded to in Landmark and Bellistri I. 
In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 280 P.3d 
225, the Kansas Court of Appeals held 
that MERS's role as mortgagee, as nom-
inee for the lender, did not sever the 
interests in the note and the mortgage. 
The court found that the agency rela-
tionship was created by the mortgage 
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itself, which "explicitly authorize[d] 
MERS to act on behalf of U.S. Bank in 
all situations related to the enforce-
ment of the Mortgage." Id. at 230. 
Howie acknowledged the potential 
issue of severance raised in Landmark, 
but explained that there could be no 
severance when the beneficial inter-
est in the mortgage and note remained 
vested in the original lender and its 
successors and assigns by the clear 
language of both the note and the 
mortgage. Id. at 227; see also MetLife 
Home Loans, 286 P.3d at 1157 (the 
existence of an agency relationship 
between MERS and lender's assignee 
was evidenced by the language of the 
mortgage itself, which clearly stated 
that the borrowers mortgaged the 
listed property "to MERS, solely as 
nominee for [lender] and [lender's1 suc-
cessors and assigns"). 
Similarly, in In re Martinez v. Mort-
gage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., after 
a thorough review of Kansas law, 
including the Restatement of Prop-
erty and other relevant authority, the 
court held that no severance of the 
note and the mortgage occurred in 
light of the language of the mortgage 
itself and MERS's membership agree-
ments with the original lender and its 
successors and assigns. 444 B.R. 192 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2011). Instead, "MERS 
was clearly acting as an agent for [the 
lender] at all relevant times," hold-
ing the mortgage as "nominee" for the 
lender and agreeing to act on the lend-
er's behalf and at its direction with 
respect to the mortgage. Id. at 205. 
"The fact that MERS and [the lender] 
chose to use the word 'nominee,' 
rather than 'agent,' [did] not alter the 
underlying relationship between the 
two parties," especially given the fact 
that the two terms have nearly identi-
cal legal definitions. Id. at 205-06. "[T] 
he [n]ote and [m]ortgage were never 
split, and remain[ed] enforceable." Id. 
at 206. 
These rulings reflect the sensible 
position that, absent fraud, a mort-
gage may be held by MERS or another 
nominee for the security of the real 
creditor, whether the creditor is the 
person named as mortgagee or some 
other party, so far as the nature of the 
transaction is reasonably disclosed. In 
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Cervantes, 656 F.3d 1034, the court 
explained that because the designa-
tion of MERS as nominee appears on 
the face of the security instrument, no 
credence would be given to claims 
of fraud or sham, nor claims that the 
borrower was misinformed or suf-
fered any injury from either MERS's 
role as a beneficiary or the possibility 
that their loans would be resold and 
tracked through the MERS System. 
This rule protects the important 
goal of facilitating mortgage transac-
tions and recognizes that to hold such 
mortgages void would frustrate the 
intentions of both mortgagors and 
mortgagees. RMS Residential, 32 A.3d 
at 317. There is simply no reason that 
"the original parties to the Note and 
Deed of Trust cannot validly contract 
at the outset 'to have someone other 
than the beneficial owner of the debt 
act on behalf of that owner to enforce 
rights granted in [the security instru-
ment].'" Commonwealth, 680 F.3d at 
1204; Horvath v. Bank of N. Y., 641 F.3d 
617,620 (4th Cir. 2011); Trent v. Mort-
gage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 F. 
App'x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead, 
as one court recently noted, "the 
choice of a mortgagee is a matter of 
convenience." Residential Funding, 805 
N.W.2d at 184 ("It has never been nec-
essary that the mortgage should be 
given directly to the beneficiaries. The 
security is always made in trust to 
secure obligations, and the trust and 
the beneficial interest need not be in 
the same hands .... ") (quoting Adams 
v. Niemann, 8 N.W. 719, 720 (Mich. 
1881)). 
In a somewhat different take on the 
issue, the Nevada Supreme Court has 
found that the designation of MERS 
as nominee does split the note and 
deed of trust at inception because an 
entity separate from the note holder is 
listed as the beneficiary and thus the 
deed of trust cannot be enforced. Edel-
stein v. Bank ofN.Y Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 
(Nev. 2012). The court points out, how-
ever, that this split is not irreparable 
or fatal, but can be cured by hav-
ing MERS assign, under its powers as 
agent, its beneficial interest in the deed 
of trust to the holder of the note. See id. 
at 252. The rejoined interests are then 
enforceable. 
The Future of MERS 
The flood of foreclosures follow-
ing the 2008 housing crisis deluged 
MERS with hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of claims from defaulting 
buyers seeking to avoid their mort-
gage obligations. MERS has survived, 
generally defeating the various 
permutations of the attacks on its 
business model and defending the 
validity of the mortgages registered 
on its system. As the courts have con-
sistently recognized, MERS's role as 
mortgagee is nothing more than that 
of an agent holding the mortgage for 
its principal. And in so doing, MERS 
has benefitted borrowers by stream-
lining the mortgage recording process 
and reducing the costs associated 
with mortgage transactions. 
Though few of the borrowers' chal-
lenges against MERS have prevailed, 
these challenges-and the broader 
challenges against the lending insti-
tutions-have sparked considerable 
debate on a variety of issues, such as 
what amount of disclosure to the bor-
rower is necessary when entering into 
mortgage transactions, what systems 
or protocols are warranted for dealing 
with a borrower in financial distress, 
and whether existing rules on nego-
tiable instruments are suitable for 
transfers of mortgages. These issues 
have led to a number of institutional 
changes, mostly in the practices of 
the lenders. See State Attorneys Gen-
eral, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement 
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers 
on Foreclosure Wrongs, Nat'l Ass'n of 
Att'ys Gen. (last visited Apr. 20, 2013), 
http://naag.org/state-attorneys-
general-feds-reach-25-billion -settle 
ment-with-five-Iargest-mortgage-
servicers-on-foreclosure-wrongs.php. 
Some changes have affected MERS 
administration and delivery of ser-
vices to its members. See Consent 
Order for In the Matter of MERSCORp, 
Inc., OCC No. AA-EC-11-20 (Apr. 13, 
2011), www.occ.gov/news-issuances/ 
news-releases / 2011 / nr-occ-2011-47h. 
pdf. These institutional changes will 
shore up the greater efficiency and 
reliability of the MERS System, which 
remains an essential player in the 
mortgage industry .• 
